Ils ont changé le monde. Les nouveaux dangers sont-ils maîtrisés?
      
                               

 

             

Hearthquake in France.

Safety equipment out of chape in nuclear power plant.

        

CONTENT

1)A wrong design

2)Complacent safety authority

3)Preserving the system

ANNEXE: Letter to the French newspaper Le Monde (4th april 2001)

      
                               

 

                           
             

1) Wrong design


Three years after an earthquake in South of France (Nice-2001), a year after an earthquake in Eastern France (Saint-Dié- 2003), the region of Besançon was shaken on the 23rd of February 2004; electric supply tripped off and many spent hours in the dark. Later, houses were scrutinised and toppled chimneys were removed. "Thrilling but not damaging" was the conclusion. In fact, the chilling aspects were out of the view of ordinary people. The instrumentation and control (I&C) cabinets for nuclear reactors, represented in the picture aside, lean out of verticality at such an extent that casings can't be closed.

 

 

       

     
                           
             

       

2) Complacent safety Authority .



This kind of cabinets proliferated for tens of years, in tens of nuclear plants, because the safety authority did not raise any objection despite the design flaw was conspicuous. In 1998 at Fessenheim, some fastening parts of I&C cabinets failed; the French nuclear safety authority (DGSNR/A-C. Lacoste) under-rated the incident neglecting that I&C cabinets are paramount to nuclear safety; in 2002, I expressed my concern to the President of France, and I asked a picture showing how cabinets look like. I had to reach the sad conclusion that French authorities are definitely unreliable. Interests at stake are huge, since 80% of French electricity is nuclear born; when gaps are really embarrassing, the personnel is silented , as illustrated in the presentation Inflicting sanctions instead of conforming to safety rules

 

      
                           
             

3)Preserving the system



Those who are responsible escape sanctions. So, the system is preserved and the irregularities proliferate, defying the accident ?

(T. Fronte)








Instrumentation and control cabinet for nuclear reactor in Saint Laurent 2 power plant. The equipment hardly stans up , although it is supposedly designed to stringent seismic requirements.

             
                           
             

ANNEXE

Letter to the French newspaper LE MONDE

 

translated excerpts :

 

... Who is next and detects technical gaps is often an employee ; in France the employee’s status is very vulnerable , even in the field of equipment classified to the highest requirements of nuclear safety ; actually, nothing can prevent the employer from applying the disciplinary procedures instead of safety rules.

 

... Thus the employee has to assess the consequences of attentivness in fulffilling his duty .

 

... Not surprising if safety irregularities linger for years and are handled only after incidents or advanced damages occur.

...

 

T. Fronte

 

( full text in French )